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COOPER’S QUIET DEMISE 
(A SHORT RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR STRAUSS) 
FREDERIC M. BLOOM* 
Change may be what law does best.1  Law adapts.  It adjusts.  It 
“translates.”2  Its enforcement varies as its enforcers change.3  Some may still 
favor less volatile legal features—doctrinal stability,4 decisional predictability,5 
judicial restraint.6  Some may even believe that the “whole purpose” of the 
Constitution is to “prevent” broad legal swings—or at least to make them quite 
difficult.7  But change is one of law’s true constants, as common as jealousy 
and as inevitable as the grave.8 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University.  J.D. 2002, Stanford. 
 1. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The 
Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 
116 (1993) (“The central problem of modern constitutionalism is how to reconcile the idea of 
fundamental law with the modernist insight that meanings are fluid and historically changing.”); 
see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997); David A. 
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1996) (“In 
fact, in the day-to-day practice of constitutional interpretation, in the courts and in general public 
discourse, the specific words of the text play at most a small role, compared to evolving 
understandings of what the Constitution requires.”). 
 2. Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 395, 406 (1995) (“A literary translator’s practice is to construct a second text in a second (or 
‘target’) language to mirror the meaning of a first text in the first (or ‘source’) language . . . .  This 
is the practice of the translator in law as well.  She constructs a reading in the second context to 
preserve the meaning of a reading within the first . . . .”). 
 3. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 
535, 570–72 (1999). 
 4. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (1997). 
 5. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 422 (1988). 
 6. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING 
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). 
 7. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (emphasis added); see also 
Fallon, supra note 3, at 571–72 (“But while Justice Scalia resists the notion that the methodology 
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Nothing has changed quite so much, David Strauss argues, as Brown v. 
Board of Education.9  This claim may seem surprising.  Brown is, after all, an 
icon among icons,10 a (seemingly) “fixed point in American constitutional 
law.”11 
But Brown’s “fixed point” has somehow moved.  What was once an 
“unchallengeable”12 triumph of anti-subordination has been turned, ironically 
and perversely, into an anti-classificationist’s victory.13  Brown’s “true legacy” 
 
of constitutional adjudication should ideally evolve, even he accepts that constitutional theory 
must adapt in practice. . . .  Justice Scalia acknowledges that courts must develop a theory that 
accommodates the timeless originalist ideal with respect for stare decisis.”) (citations and 
emphasis omitted). 
 8. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 935 (“Gradual innovation . . . has always been a part of the 
common law tradition, as it has been a part of American constitutionalism.”); Lessig, supra note 
2, at 396 (“No theory that ignored these changes, or that presumed that constitutional 
interpretation could go on without these changes, could be a theory of our Constitution.  Change 
is at its core.”); see also Fallon, supra note 3, at 572 (“Claims such as these may appear to verge 
on constitutional, or at least constitutional theoretical, nihilism.  If the best constitutional theory 
may vary from era to era, why should it not also vary from case to case?”). 
 9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 10. See Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009992. 
 11. David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065 
(2008). 
 12. Id. at 1065, 1082.  In some ways, Brown still seems unchallengeable—in outcome, if not 
in rationale.  As Professor Lessig has explained, “[n]o one questions Brown’s result (anymore).  
Indeed, so completely has the legal system reoriented itself after the decision that it may not even 
be possible to find the legal material with which to mount a serious challenge to its conclusion.”  
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1242 (1993) (citations omitted).  
“In a world where a conservative like Justice Scalia says the correctness of the decision ‘leaves 
no room for doubt,’” Professor Lessig adds, “it is difficult to reconstruct the world where liberals 
such as Professor Herbert Wechsler could worry that no principled opinion could be written to 
support it.”  Id. (citation omitted); see also Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose 
in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 999 n.4 (1986) (“For 
a generation, one criterion for an acceptable constitutional theory has been whether that theory 
explains why [Brown] . . . was correct.”).  But see John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1463 n.295 (1992) (“I do not think that my theory of the 
14th Amendment stands or falls with [its ability to accommodate Brown].  Man is not the 
measure of all things, as Socrates replied to the Sophists, and neither is [Brown]. . . .  An 
interpretation of the Constitution is not wrong because it would produce a different result in 
Brown.”).  Professor Lessig may well be right—even if, as Professor Strauss counsels, we should 
take Wechsler’s worries seriously.  But true or not, the soundness of Brown’s result is only part 
of the matter.  How the Court reached its outcome is of comparable concern—and no small 
measure of dispute. 
 13. Strauss, supra note 11, at 1083–86. 
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has been “undermine[d],”14 Professor Strauss tells us; its real meaning has 
been lost.15  And this, he says, is “indefensible.”16 
Yet Professor Strauss’s prognosis is not entirely grim.  With characteristic 
precision and elegance,17 Professor Strauss does more than recount Brown’s 
lamentable shift.  He also sets a course for revival and reclamation.  He asks us 
to look at Brown (and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District18) once more—not through the 
same tired glasses, but through the prism of 1950s Little Rock and the lens of 
Cooper v. Aaron.19 
Why Little Rock’s prism?  And why Cooper’s lens?  Professor Strauss 
offers an alluring answer: Little Rock and Cooper provide special insight, he 
says, a unique perspective on Brown’s sacred promise.  The “frenzied crowds” 
outside Central High School, the mobilized National Guard units, the federal 
paratroopers—these things helped reveal Brown for what it meant, not just for 
what it said.20  They helped to expose, that is, Brown’s true anti-caste heart.21 
These things also helped produce an extraordinary Supreme Court opinion 
in Cooper, a decision that posits the Court at the very center of our 
constitutional universe.22  Cooper’s resounding “judicial supremacy” call is 
 
 14. Id. at 1086. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Strauss, supra note 11, at 1068. 
 17. Professor Strauss’s excellent lecture also holds a bit of a surprise—not in its conclusion, 
but in its mode of analysis.  Very little of Professor Strauss’s analysis incorporates post-Brown 
doctrine, looking instead at Brown as a kind of static text.  This seems, to me, like a perfectly 
reasonable approach, but one at least somewhat unexpected from Professor Strauss himself.  If 
Brown is our anchor text, after all, some may say that its meaning is informed not just by its own 
words, but by the “elaborate body of [Brown] law that has developed, mostly through judicial 
decisions, over the years.”  Strauss, supra note 1, at 877.  This is what Chief Justice Roberts 
seems to suggest, however tacitly, in his opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751–61 (2007). 
 18. 551 U.S. ___,  127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 19. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 20. Professor Strauss writes that “the Little Rock school integration crisis that led to Cooper 
was a turning point”—a kind of catalyst of cultural change.  Strauss, supra note 11, at 1066.  On 
the intricate interplay of law, culture, and civil rights, see especially MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, 
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY (2004). 
 21. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 1067 (“Little Rock showed the national audience that 
segregation was a part of a racial caste system that treated African Americans as an inferior race.  
That was why Brown was correct . . . .”). 
 22. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18–19 (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of 
the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the 
Country. . . .  It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this 
Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land . . . .”); see also Larry D. Kramer, The 
Supreme Court 2000 Term—Forward: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6 (2001) (“But here 
is the striking thing: in the years since Cooper v. Aaron, the idea of judicial supremacy—the 
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itself totemic—so much so that Professor Fallon uses it as the anchor of his 
“Pure Judicial Supremacy Model.”23  It is also deeply controversial.24  Judge 
Wilkinson deems Cooper “both unrealistic and undesirable.”25  Professor 
Kurland calls Cooper the Court’s “Louis XIV’s notion of itself, ‘l’etat, c’est 
moi.’”26  Professor Strauss, with greater reserve, says that Cooper may seem to 
“go too far,” at least with regard to Congress and the President.27 
And about this, Professor Strauss may well be right. 
But this short Essay suggests—tentatively and tendentiously—that Cooper 
is both more and less than all of that.  It suggests that Cooper’s emphatic 
declaration of judicial supremacy is a bluff, a bit of forced and overheated 
rhetoric informed less by grand notions of Court authority and more by the 
peculiar facts of Little Rock.  Even more, this Essay suggests that significant 
holes in Cooper’s judicial supremacy armor could be seen well before the 
Court put pen to paper—and can still be seen today. 
To that end, this Essay takes (or attempts to take) four related steps, some 
more novel than others.  It first reconsiders Cooper itself, concentrating on 
Justice Frankfurter’s instructive—if long-ignored—concurring opinion.28  This 
Essay then locates Cooper in slightly broader doctrinal context, calling 
particular attention to one of Cooper’s odd doctrinal contemporaries: Williams 
v. Georgia.29  From there, this Essay examines the lessons we might learn from 
 
notion that judges have the last word when it comes to constitutional interpretation and that their 
decisions determine the meaning of the Constitution for everyone—has finally found widespread 
approbation.”). 
 23. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Executive Power and the Political Constitution, 2007 UTAH L. 
REV. 1, 11 (2007).  Professor Roosevelt’s thoughtful contribution to this Issue unpacks the idea of 
“judicial supremacy” more carefully than I do here.  See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Judicial 
Supremacy, Judicial Activism: Cooper v. Aaron and Parents Involved, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1191 
(2008).  He is surely right that “judicial supremacy” has different foundations and different 
manifestations—and that these details improve our understanding of the core “judicial 
supremacy” concept.  For the purposes of this Essay, however, even the crudest notion of 
“judicial supremacy” will do, so I leave the subtler definitions to Professor Roosevelt. 
 24. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 259–64 (1962); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF 
CONSENT 105–11 (1975); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: 
Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 388 (1982) (“Cooper has come under 
scathing attack . . . .”). 
 25. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955–
1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV. 485, 520 (1978). 
 26. Philip B. Kurland, “Brown v. Board of Education Was the Beginning”—The School 
Desegregation Cases in the United States Supreme Court: 1954–1979, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 309, 
328 (1979); see also PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN 
COURT 116 (1970) (asserting that, in Cooper, the Court got “carried away with its own sense of 
righteousness”). 
 27. Strauss, supra note 11, at 1080. 
 28. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20–26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 29. 349 U.S. 375 (1955). 
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our slightly expanded perspective.  And to close, this Essay argues that if we 
listen carefully to Cooper—as Professor Strauss suggests we should—we may 
hear something we don’t quite expect.  We may hear, in short, that the Court in 
Cooper never quite meant what it said.30 
I. 
None of these steps does much good, of course, without a bit of 
background.  So, at the risk of repeating what Professor Strauss31 and others32 
have already carefully recalled, it makes sense to reset the basic scene. 
It is mid-1950s Arkansas.  The State’s political-opportunist of a governor, 
Orval Faubus,33 has mobilized the State’s National Guard in the hope of 
blocking integration of Little Rock’s public schools.34  “[A]ngry white crowds” 
have descended on the city, “jeer[ing]” black schoolchildren and “attack[ing] 
reporters.”35  All involved are uneasy.  Serious violence seems assured. 
President Eisenhower, at best an ambivalent supporter of Brown,36 has 
responded by deploying paratroopers to Little Rock.37  These troops help avert 
 
 30. Cooper adherents and detractors alike seem to take the Court’s words at face value.  
They believe, that is, that at least the Court in Cooper believed what it said.  This Essay hopes to 
suggest just the opposite—that Cooper never quite meant what it said.  Whether the Cooper Court 
should have meant what it said is clearly an important (and related) question, but it is not one I 
wish to engage here. 
 31. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 1076–82. 
 32. See Farber, supra note 24, at 390–96. 
 33. See id. at 393 (“Even today, the motives behind Governor Faubus’s change of position 
are not completely clear. . . .  Whatever his motives, his actions are clear.”). 
 34. Id. (noting that Faubus “claimed merely to be preserving public order”) (citation 
omitted). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 394 (“President Eisenhower previously had not taken a strong stand on civil rights.  
Even today his views on the merits of Brown remain unclear.”) (citation omitted); see also 
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Independence: Remarks by Justice Breyer, 95 GEO. L.J. 903, 907 (2007) 
(“That President Eisenhower dispatched the troops even though his feelings about Brown were 
ambivalent only heightens the extent to which sentiments about the judiciary’s independence had 
changed . . . .”).  As it happens, President Eisenhower’s ambivalence helped give voice to some 
powerful “judicial supremacy” rhetoric.  When asked if he agreed with Brown’s outcome, 
President Eisenhower extolled Court power, not Court prescience: “[I]t makes no difference 
whether or not I endorse [Brown].  The Constitution is as the Supreme Court interprets it . . . .”  2 
STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT 338 (1984).  For a more detailed study of 
President Eisenhower’s reaction to Brown, see Joel K. Goldstein, Justice O’Connor’s Twenty-
Five Year Expectation: The Legitimacy of Durational Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83, 141 
(2006) (“President Eisenhower did little to develop support for Brown.”) (citing The President’s 
News Conference, PUB. PAPERS 489, 491–93 (May 19, 1954); The President’s News Conference, 
PUB. PAPERS 182, 186 (Jan. 25, 1956); The President’s News Conference, PUB. PAPERS 263, 
269–70 (Feb. 29, 1956); The President’s News Conference, PUB. PAPERS 301, 304 (Mar. 14, 
1956); The President’s News Conference, PUB. PAPERS 732, 736 (Sept. 5, 1956)). 
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massive mob violence, but they do little to soften Faubus’s segregationist 
stand.38  By early 1958, in fact, Faubus and the Arkansas legislature have made 
public school integration effectively impossible; even more, by early 1958, 
Faubus and the Arkansas legislature have threatened to reinstitute official 
segregation.39  Brown v. Board, they have decided, does not apply to them.40  
So they have thumbed their noses at the Court. 
And in response the Supreme Court does not flinch.41  In Cooper, the 
Court finds against Faubus and the Arkansas legislature.  It chides the State’s 
behavior.  And it toes Brown’s line firmly and emphatically—recounting the 
evils of discrimination, reasserting the rights of African American children, 
and rejecting the menace of “evasive” segregationist “schemes.”42 
But Cooper does much more than this—more than was necessary, as the 
Court candidly admits.43  Cooper also sounds its familiar “judicial supremacy” 
call.  It recites the (supposedly) “basic principle that the federal judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . .”44  It asserts that 
decisions “enunciated by th[e] Court” are themselves “the supreme law of the 
 
 37. As Professor Farber has explained, the story is a bit more complicated than my brief 
summary suggests.  Before President Eisenhower deployed the troops, he met with Faubus 
personally—and the meeting left Eisenhower “with the impression” that Faubus would relent.  
Farber, supra note 24, at 395.  But Faubus did no such thing.  Instead, he removed the National 
Guard troops in a manner that “[left] no way of controlling the angry crowds [then] surrounding 
the school.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Only then did President Eisenhower respond directly, first 
with a (futile) proclamation and then with federal troops.  Id. at 395–96 (adding that President 
Eisenhower was careful to state that “personal opinions about the [Brown] decision have no 
bearing on the matter of enforcement”) (citations omitted). 
 38. Id. at 396 (“Although the federal forces could control crowds . . . they could not control 
other forms of white resistance.”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Farber, supra note 24, at 395–96 (“[Faubus] declared that ‘the Supreme Court 
decision is not the law of the land.’”). 
 41. Nor could it, as Professor Strauss notes.  Had the Court backed down in Cooper, it would 
have embarrassed more than itself.  It would have embarrassed the entirety of the federal 
government, President Eisenhower included.  See Strauss, supra note 11, at 1079 (“Especially 
after it had finally elicited support from the executive branch, the Court could not possibly have 
given any sign that it was backing away from Brown, and it did not.”); see also KLARMAN, supra 
note 20, at 328–29 (“Cooper v. Aaron was easy for the justices . . . .  Now that the president had 
finally provided [political support for Brown], the justices had no choice but to back him up.”); 
Farber, supra note 24, at 402 (“In retrospect, it is hard to see how the Court could have avoided 
making such a plea for obedience to Brown . . . .”). 
 42. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1958). 
 43. See id. at 17 (“What has been said, in the light of the facts developed, is enough to 
dispose of the case.  However, we should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor and 
Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the Brown case.”). 
 44. Id. at 18. 
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land.”45  And it admonishes all who can hear it that the Supreme Court “must 
be obeyed.”46 
These are famous words—now banal to some,47 still provocative to 
others.48  These words will, no doubt, be admired and assailed for years to 
come.  But just how seriously should we take Cooper’s “judicial supremacy” 
call?  Is the Court’s supremacy “rule” as vigorous and categorical as it may 
seem?  Or is it simply a handy dialectical tool, ready to be attacked or 
supported regardless of its real effect? 
Justice Frankfurter suggests surprising answers to these questions.  In his 
revealing—if long-overlooked—concurrence, in fact, Justice Frankfurter 
subtly hints that Cooper may not mean exactly what it says.49 
That Justice Frankfurter wrote separately at all was no small matter.  Other 
Justices believed the Court should speak as a single, unified group in 
Cooper50—the better, they thought, to “dramatize the Court’s adherence to 
Brown.”51  But Justice Frankfurter wished to write separately.  More than that, 
he wished to address a particular audience: “Southern lawyers and law 
professors”—those Southern “legal profession[als]” who might, over time, 
help the Court effect a “gradual thawing of the ice.”52  So against the forceful 
urging of his colleagues, Justice Frankfurter penned a rather strange 
concurrence in Cooper—though he delayed its announcement until days after 
the majority spoke.53 
Justice Frankfurter’s strange concurrence begins with an ode to 
cooperation: “By working together [and] by sharing in a common effort,” 
Justice Frankfurter writes, “men of different minds and tempers, even if they 
do not reach agreement, acquire understanding and thereby tolerance of their 
differences.”54  Our goal, Justice Frankfurter suggests, is common and 
laudable, if still imperfect.  We all wish, he says, to get along peacefully, even 
when we never quite agree.  But this kind of broad social harmony requires 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 24, at 264 (emphasis added). 
 47. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 22, at 6 (“But here is the striking thing: in the years since 
Cooper v. Aaron, the idea of judicial supremacy . . . has finally found widespread approbation.”). 
 48. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 221 (2004). 
 49. 358 U.S. at 20–26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 50. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the 
Supreme Court: 1948–1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 79–83 (1979). 
 51. See Farber, supra note 24, at 401 (citation omitted). 
 52. See Hutchinson, supra note 50, at 84 (citing Letter from Justice Frankfurter, United 
States Supreme Court Justice, to C.C. Burlingham, at 2 (Nov. 12, 1958)). 
 53. See Farber, supra note 24, at 401 (“Although Justice Frankfurter had wanted to write a 
separate opinion, he was dissuaded from announcing it the same day as the main opinion.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 54. 358 U.S. at 20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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more than good intentions and a few pointed Supreme Court declarations.  It 
requires “the constructive use of time”—something, Justice Frankfurter 
implies, that had been lacking since Brown was decided.55 
So Justice Frankfurter offers a kind of apologia to Southern States: Some 
Supreme Court decisions, he acknowledges, will stir “deep emotions.”56  Some 
Supreme Court decisions, like Brown, will even involve painful and “drastic 
alteration[s] in the . . . communities . . . involved.”57  This is an inevitable, if 
uncomfortable, consequence of our constitutional scheme.58 
But it is not an edict for “immediate” or “overnight” change.59  Instead, it 
is an occasion for discourse, a constitutional dialogue that envisions both give 
and take.60  States may have their say, Justice Frankfurter intimates.  States 
may even resist Supreme Court edicts on occasion, provided they do so in 
appropriate ways.61  “[B]rute power,” mass violence, and “forcible 
interference”62—these things are simply too much, Justice Frankfurter 
explains; they fall outside the boundaries of permissible constitutional 
resistance, not least because they threaten anarchy and the untangling of our 
social fabric.63  But more careful, guarded, and subtle forms of resistance can 
fall within the bounds of acceptable debate and defiance.  Some cautious bouts 
of state defiance, Justice Frankfurter quietly concedes, can even evade the 
Court’s supreme rebuke.64 
It is an odd concession, to be sure.  It is especially peculiar to find this nod 
to state defiance in Cooper, a case long-thought to be preoccupied with 
unfettered Court authority.  But it is a concession Justice Frankfurter 
knowingly rendered, and it carries an invitation he was particularly able to 
make.  For Justice Frankfurter was not writing his concurrence in Cooper on a 
 
 55. Id. at 25. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. 358 U.S. at 24–25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 60. For this proposition, Justice Frankfurter quotes a rather telling source: President Andrew 
Jackson’s Message to Congress of January 16, 1833.  See 358 U.S. at 24.  Students of Supreme 
Court history know that President Jackson was, at times, a rather vehement critic of notions of 
“judicial supremacy”—as was President Lincoln, who is quoted near the end of Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurrence.  Id. at 26.  It may be too much to suggest that Justice Frankfurter’s 
quotation selection sends its own powerful message about tolerable defiance.  But it is not too 
much to suggest that Justice Frankfurter chose his sources carefully and intentionally. 
 61. Id. at 21–22. 
 62. Id. at 22–25. 
 63. Id. at 22; see also Norman R. Williams, Executive Review in the Fragmented Executive: 
State Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 565, 613 (2006) 
(“Significantly, . . . Cooper did not deny the power of state officials to enforce the Constitution, 
but rather only to disregard the Supreme Court’s interpretation once made.”). 
 64. 358 U.S. at 22. 
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clean slate.  He was writing as the author of Williams v. Georgia,65 a story of 
successful state defiance decided less than three years before. 
II. 
Williams v. Georgia is an odd case.  It is also a nearly-forgotten case, one 
best considered by Del Dickson more than a decade ago.66  And Williams is 
surely a hard case, though its core story can be quickly retold. 
In October 1952, a liquor store clerk named Harry Furst was shot and 
killed in Atlanta.67  Local police soon arrested Aubry Lee Williams, a twenty-
seven-year-old African American man, and charged him with Furst’s murder.68  
In time, Williams was tried by a state jury, one empanelled through a “colored 
ticket” system all would come to acknowledge as unconstitutional.69  But 
Williams’s attorney70 failed to object to this selection process—“even though 
the Georgia Supreme Court had criticized [the] use of colored tickets” in Avery 
v. State,71 and even though “the U.S. Supreme Court had granted certiorari in 
[Avery] only the day before.”72  Trial lasted less than a day.73  Williams was 
convicted and sentenced to death.74 
 
 65. 349 U.S. 375 (1955). 
 66. Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams 
v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423 (1994). 
 67. See id. at 1426; see also BARRETT PRETTYMAN, JR., DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 
258–63 (1961). 
 68. See Dickson, supra note 66, at 1426 (citing True Bill, Williams v. State, 78 S.E.2d 521 
(Ga. 1953) (No. 18348), reprinted in Bill of Exceptions at 1–2, Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 
(Ga. 1954) (No. 18548)). 
 69. Dickson, supra note 66, at 1427–28; Del Dickson’s summary of this “colored ticket” 
system is especially helpful: 
  At the time, jury panels in Fulton County were selected on a weekly basis by a 
superior court judge, who drew tickets from a wooden box containing the names of all 
qualified men in the jurisdiction.  The wooden container was called a traverse jury box, 
and those who were selected were called traverse jurors.  The drawing was not a random 
process: white prospective jurors had their names written on white tickets, while everyone 
else had their names placed on yellow tickets.  This allowed state officials to monitor—
and presumably limit—the number of racial minorities allowed to serve as jurors in 
Fulton County.  The yellow cards that were drawn were generally assigned to the criminal 
calendar, at least in part because the state could challenge black jurors more easily in 
criminal trials than in civil cases. 
Id. at 1427 (citations omitted).  Professor Dickson also notes that Williams confessed, somewhat 
reluctantly, to Furst’s murder—though the details of this confession were never confirmed.  See 
id. at 1426–27, 1427 n.11 (citations omitted).  Neither the Georgia Supreme Court nor the U.S. 
Supreme Court devotes much, if any, attention to this confession.  Whether it otherwise tacitly 
informed those courts’ analyses is an open question. 
 70. Williams’s defense attorney, the somewhat ironically-named Carter Goode, would 
eventually be named an assistant attorney general for the State of Georgia.  See id. at 1471. 
 71. Id. at 1428 (citing Avery v. State, 70 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1952)). 
 72. Id. 
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On direct and collateral appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.75  
The state court did recognize the problem of colored tickets;76 it even 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court had since declared the colored-ticket 
method of jury-selection unconstitutional in Avery.77  But the state court still 
found against Williams, concluding that he had abandoned his constitutional 
claims: “When [Williams] failed to raise this question when the [jury] panel 
was put upon him,” the court wrote, “he waived the question once and for 
all.”78 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari five months later.79  A difficult 
period of deliberation followed.  So divided was the Court, in fact, that Justice 
Frankfurter “set to writing” his opinion without formal assignment from Chief 
Justice Warren.80  But just one week after it issued its (in)famous “all 
deliberate speed” decision in Brown II,81 the Court rejected Georgia’s waiver 
conclusion, vacated Williams’s conviction, and remanded to Georgia’s 
courts—adding only the gentlest82 instructions to conduct a new trial.83 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Dickson, supra note 66, at 1428 (citation omitted). 
 75. For a more complete account of Williams’s unsuccessful walk through Georgia’s 
appellate process, see id. at 1429–32. 
 76. See Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Ga. 1954). 
 77. Id.; see also Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953). 
 78. Williams, 82 S.E.2d at 218–20 (citations omitted). 
 79. See Dickson, supra note 66, at 1432–36 (“This time Justices Douglas, Black, Warren, 
and Clark voted to grant certiorari . . . .”).  It was not an easy or uncontroversial vote.  Professor 
Dickson’s careful review of primary sources helps tell this story best.  See id. at 1432–37.  For 
now, it is enough to note that Justices and clerks alike were concerned about the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction and the (potentially) adequate and independent state ground for Georgia’s decision.  
Id. 
 80. See id. at 1447. 
 81. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 82. During the Court’s post-argument conference, Justice Frankfurter stressed the “Court’s 
duty to guard against undermining a state’s responsibility for enforcing its own criminal laws.”  
Dickson, supra note 66, at 1445.  Justice Frankfurter also cautioned the Court against 
  impos[ing] federal standards of fair play on the states, [or] . . . let[ting] a hard case 
bring the federal judiciary into violence with state governments.  Not only did the Court 
have a constitutional duty to respect state autonomy, Frankfurter explained, but the Court 
could not run roughshod over state law enforcement without damaging its own prestige 
and authority. 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  This seems a rather unmistakable preview of 
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Cooper.  See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20–26 (1958) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also supra notes 50–65 and accompanying text (discussing 
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Cooper). 
 83. See Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 389, 391 (1955); see also KLARMAN, supra note 
20, at 324 (“The Court declined to reverse outright, but it strongly hinted that it might do so if 
Georgia refused to order a new trial.”). 
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The Georgia Supreme Court refused.84  Not three days85 after it received 
the Supreme Court’s opinion the Georgia court reaffirmed its initial decision, 
telling the Supreme Court that it would not “supinely surrender sovereign 
powers of th[e] State” to an intermeddling federal court.86  It would order no 
new trial.  Nor would it delay Williams’s execution.  Indeed, it would do 
nothing the Supreme Court asked it or commanded it to do.  Georgia simply 
decided to ignore binding Supreme Court precedent.  Or, as Barrett Prettyman 
pithily summarized some time later, Georgia simply told to the Supreme Court 
to “go to hell.”87 
This may surprise us.88  It may even astonish students of Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee,89 Testa v. Katt,90 and Cooper itself.  Even Georgia’s Chief 
Justice expected to be called before the Supreme Court on contempt 
charges91—though he was prepared to issue contempt citations to Chief Justice 
Warren (and other Supreme Court Justices) right back.92 
But even more surprising is what happened next: the Supreme Court 
flinched.  When Williams filed a second request for Supreme Court review, the 
Court denied certiorari—unanimously.93  It allowed the Georgia Supreme 
Court to flout directly apposite precedent; even more, it allowed the state court 
to flout the law of that very case.  Georgia’s courts defied the Supreme Court 
and won.  Williams was executed on March 30, 195694—just eighteen months 
before Orval Faubus mobilized the National Guard in Little Rock.95 
 
 84. See Williams v. State, 88 S.E.2d 376, 377 (Ga. 1955). 
 85. Though the Supreme Court decided Williams on June 6, the opinion was not filed with 
the Georgia Supreme Court until July 13, 1955.  The Georgia Supreme Court issued its response 
on July 15.  Dickinson, supra note 66, at 1456. 
 86. Id. at 377.  A dismissal of the Supreme Court’s judgment accompanied the state court’s 
decision.  Id. 
 87. See PRETTYMAN, supra note 67, at 290. 
 88. It may also have surprised the Court.  Professor Burt has argued that, “[w]hatever the 
Justices might have feared regarding elite or popular reception of any order for immediate school 
desegregation, they had no remotely comparable reason to anticipate resistance to an order for a 
new trial for Aubry Williams.”  Robert A. Burt, Brown’s Reflection, 103 YALE L.J. 1483, 1484 
(1993). 
 89. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (asserting the Supreme Court’s authority to exercise 
appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments on questions of federal law). 
 90. 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that a state court must enforce federal law—provided 
it has “jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate”). 
 91. Dickson, supra note 66, at 1458. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1464 (“All nine Justices voted to deny certiorari.”) (citation omitted). 
 94. Id. at 1465. 
 95. See Farber, supra note 24, at 393. 
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III. 
So Williams v. Georgia is an odd, awkward, and unsettling case.  It is also 
a bad fit with Cooper v. Aaron, the Court’s most emphatic assertion of its 
supposed supremacy.  But Williams and Cooper are more than a curious 
doctrinal mismatch.  They are an unexpectedly illuminating pair, and there are 
real lessons to be learned from juxtaposing the two. 
One lesson might be that something—or everything—changed between 
1955 and 1958.  Perhaps the addition of Justice Brennan between Williams and 
Cooper dramatically altered the Court’s sense of its own power.96  Perhaps 
Williams itself induced more aggressive state defiance—for many states did 
view Williams as evidence of Court cowardice, real proof that they could 
“stand up to the . . . Court . . . and get away with it.”97  And perhaps Williams 
embarrassed and emboldened the Supreme Court, teaching it that passivity and 
moral suasion of the type Justice Frankfurter envisioned would not work with 
obdurate Southern states.98 
A second lesson may be that Brown is simply different—and that Cooper’s 
“judicial supremacy” rhetoric is more targeted than thoroughgoing.  Professor 
Dickson makes this claim, arguing that the Court wished to sustain Brown 
specifically—and that it would tolerate “individual injustices” if necessary to 
do so.99  Professor Strauss hints at this idea as well, noting that the Court could 
scarcely show “any sign that it was backing away from Brown.”100 
 
 96. Justice Brennan joined the Court in late 1956, filling a seat vacated by Justice Sherman 
Minton.  For a fuller account of Justice Brennan’s nomination, see generally Stephen Wermiel, 
The Nomination of Justice Brennan: Eisenhower’s Mistake? A Look at the Historical Record, 11 
CONST. COMMENT. 515 (1994–1995).  Wermiel begins: “The nomination of William J. Brennan, 
Jr. in 1956 to be an associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court occupies that familiar place in 
modern American legal history that is at once . . . a tangible event and a subject of considerable 
mythology and speculation.”  Id. at 515. 
 97. Dickson, supra note 66, at 1469. 
 98. Id. at 1472 (“The Justices . . . adopted an informal strategy of seeking to avoid 
unnecessary confrontations with Southern governments over ancillary racial issues.”). 
 99. Id. at 1477–78 (“[A] clear pattern emerges here that the Justices sought to protect the 
Court’s institutional authority and the integrity of Brown from Southern attack, even when their 
actions resulted in significant individual injustices.”); see also NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, 
THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 156 (2004) (discussing the Court’s interest in “sidestepp[ing] . 
. . explosive confrontation[s] . . . rather than risk thwarting or seriously handicapping its decision 
in Brown . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 100. Strauss, supra note 11, at 1079.  In some ways, of course, Williams and Brown are not 
especially far apart, so the concentration on one may have implicated the other anyway.  See Burt, 
supra note 88, at 1491 (noting that both cases “attempted to combat the racial caste system while 
acknowledging uncertainty as to whether such action was permitted by positive law”); see also id. 
(adding that both cases “proclaimed the racial caste system immoral but did not purport to force 
this judgment on others; instead, they appealed to others’ legal and moral capacities to reach 
independent judgments . . .”).  But see id. at 1492–93 (claiming that because “Williams’ 
conviction was not an especially outrageous application of Jim Crow”—since “there was no 
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And another related lesson may be that Cooper’s “judicial supremacy” 
language is significantly overstated.  At the least, Williams suggests that 
Cooper does not always mean what it says—and that the Court did not expect 
it would.  Williams suggests, that is, that sometimes the Court will abide, even 
invite, dissent and defiance, so long as that defiance falls within the field of 
appropriate constitutional play.101  If states defy with violence and guns, the 
Court will push back vigorously, as it did in Cooper.  But if states package 
their defiance more carefully—if they wrap it in more legalistic and 
proceduralist clothes—the Court may stand aside.  Present a superficially 
compliant but fundamentally evasive “pupil placement” plan, as Birmingham 
did in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education,102 and the Court may 
blink.  Mask direct state-court defiance in convoluted questions of waiver and 
adequate-and-independent-state-grounds doctrine, as Georgia did in 
Williams,103 and the Court may flinch. 
IV. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that all legalist or proceduralist defiance 
will prevail.  Far from it, as readers of NAACP v. Alabama’s extended tale well 
know.104  In the end, there is simply no easy line of defiance to track and no 
 
plausible suggestion on the trial record that Williams was innocent”—Williams was only a 
“garden variety” episode of a racial caste system). 
 101. See Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (2008). 
 102. 358 U.S. 101 (1958); see also KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 330–31 (“By 1958, pupil 
placement had become a preferred method of avoiding desegregation; every southern state had 
adopted such a scheme.  . . .  Alabama officials were ‘jubilant’ over Shuttlesworth, which 
Governor Patterson saw ‘as an indication that the Supreme Court is going to let us handle our 
own affairs.’”) (citation omitted). 
 103. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 389 (1955).  Professor Burt has rightly noted that 
Williams was not a jurisdictional slam-dunk.  “It is evident from the Justices’ deliberations,” he 
writes, “that most of them were convinced that the Georgia courts had not invoked their 
procedural ground as a ruse . . . ; accordingly, the Justices were troubled about the basis for their 
jurisdiction, in light of the apparently independent, adequate state procedural ground.”  See Burt, 
supra note 88, at 1484–85.  But it is likewise true that the Court’s jurisdictional concerns 
manifested in an unusual way: Rather than vacating their initial, jurisdictionally dubious decision, 
the Justices simply left it in place for Georgia to defy it outright.  This is a significant difference.  
In the end, of course, the result is generally the same—at least for Aubry Williams.  But if Justice 
Frankfurter is correct that “the fact that [the Court has] jurisdiction does not compel [the Justices] 
to exercise it,” Williams, 349 U.S. at 389, he elides a critical point: Everything changes once the 
Justices have “exercise[d]” their jurisdiction.  Put slightly differently, the choice to exercise 
jurisdiction is one thing.  See, e.g., DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 99, at 156 (noting that the Court 
refused to hear a challenge to Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law in 1955, despite the 
offensiveness of the law, because the Court wished to avoid conflict with potentially obdurate 
states).  The choice to allow defiance of that jurisdiction is quite another. 
 104. That tale involved four trips to the Supreme Court.  After trip four, the state relented.  
See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S. 16 
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simple trend of supremacy to follow.  If anything, in fact, the doctrine 
produces only a “patchwork without pattern”105—not a clear pattern at all. 
But that is precisely the point.  Cooper would have us believe that there is 
a categorical rule of “judicial supremacy,” a clear pattern of obedience to the 
Supreme Court.  There is no such rule, no such pattern.  Instead, the Court has 
set a more intricate and nuanced field for constitutional debate.  Some defiance 
is outside that field; it is, like the defiance in Little Rock, definitively out-of-
bounds.  But some defiance is permitted, even invited, however cryptically.106  
Put slightly differently, some holes exist in the Court’s “judicial supremacy” 
armor—and some states, like Georgia in Williams, occasionally find them. 
So Orval Faubus’s mistake in Cooper was not that he entered the 
constitutional debate at all, attempting a kind of “popular constitutionalism”—
to borrow Dean Kramer’s term.107  His mistake was the means and the manner 
he used: His method of popular constitutionalism was too violent and too 
combative.  His attempt at constitutional debate, that is, was simply too far out-
of-bounds. 
What’s left, then, is a somewhat surprising claim.108  What’s left is the 
sense that Cooper’s “judicial supremacy” rhetoric substantially outstripped the 
Court’s real vision and the Court’s real plan.109  For the Court does indulge, 
 
(1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 360 U.S. 240 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 105. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 146 (1980). 
 106. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 107. See KRAMER, supra note 48.  Orval Faubus may well be a popular constitutionalist of a 
sort.  Even so, Dean Kramer omits Faubus from his seminal book on the topic—and some, most 
notably Professor Powe, have criticized Dean Kramer for the omission.  See L.A. Powe, Jr., Are 
the “People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 869–70 (2005) 
(“Massive Resistance had forced the Court into a retreat of several years, and it produced the 
assertion of judicial supremacy that so infuriates Kramer.  Yet he never even mentions it.”). 
 108. It seems especially surprising in this post-Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), post-
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), world.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and 
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 163 (1997) 
(noting that Boerne represents a “startlingly strong view of judicial supremacy”). 
 109. See, e.g., DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 99, at 12.  Professors Devins and Fisher make a 
comparable point in refreshingly direct—and humorous—terms: 
  The Court’s habit of declaring itself the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution must be 
read with caution.  First, who does the Court say is the final word?  Itself.  Without being 
overly skeptical, isn’t there a bit of self-interest here, a claim that is patently self-serving?  
How would we respond if the President said that of all the people in the country it was his 
considered judgment that he is the most intelligent?  Jay Leno and other late-night comics 
would have a field day. 
Id.  Dean Kramer makes a similar claim, calling Cooper “just bluster and puff” and accusing the 
Court of “not reporting a fact so much as trying to manufacture one.”  KRAMER, supra note 48, at 
221.   It should be noted, of course, that Dean Kramer, Professor Devins, and Professor Fisher 
still take the Court’s words at face value; that is, they still assume that the Court means what it 
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even invite, some defiance of its decisions.  It did then—both in Williams and, 
more quietly, in Justice Frankfurter’s Cooper concurrence.  And it does 
now:110 in Roper v. Simmons, where the Missouri Supreme Court ignored 
recent, seemingly binding Supreme Court precedent;111 in Lockyer v. Andrade, 
where the California courts ignored apposite, seemingly controlling Supreme 
Court doctrine;112 and almost again in Texas quite recently, where the Texas 
courts flirted with ignoring a Supreme Court stay of execution.113 
These are all difficult stories—no easier than Cooper and Williams 
themselves.  But difficult stories can be revealing, and sometimes they offer 
the greatest surprise.  The stories of Williams and Roper and Andrade and 
(even) Cooper reveal something we might not expect: States can, and 
sometimes do, disobey binding Supreme Court precedent.114  It is a truth that 
runs directly contrary to Cooper’s famous call for state fealty.  But it is a truth 
the Supreme Court allows all the same. 
So is Professor Strauss correct that we benefit from reading Brown and 
Parents Involved through the prism of Little Rock and the lens of Cooper v. 
Aaron?  Of course he is.  We would do well to follow his able lead. 
But if Cooper is our lens, we should also be careful to acknowledge where 
it is cracked.  Orval Faubus deserved all that he got in Cooper, but the 
Supreme Court did not mean all that it said.  Beneath Cooper’s noisy shouts of 
“judicial supremacy” are whispers of Cooper’s own quiet demise.  We would 
do well to listen to those whispers too. 
 
says—even if it should not.  I hope to show the converse: that the Court did not mean what it said 
in Cooper—even if it should.  (And I leave that “should” question unanswered here.). 
 110. See especially Bloom, supra note 101. 
 111. 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also Bloom, supra note 101. 
 112. 538 U.S. 63 (2003); see also Bloom, supra note 101. 
 113. See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal & Linda Greenhouse, Texas Planning New Execution 
Despite Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007, at A1; Ralph Blumenthal, Texas Ruling Signals Halt 
To Executions Indefinitely, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at A16. 
 114. See generally Bloom, supra note 101. 
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